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STANDARDIZED INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES
1953 CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT*
Adopted by the
Association of District Judges of Nebraska
No. 1
ARREST-DEFINITION
An arrest is taking custody of another person for the purpose of
holding or detaining him to answer a criminal charge.
No. 2
ARREST-CONDUCT OF OFFICER
In order for you to determine whether the conduct of the officer
in making the arrest was wrongful you are advised that the officer
need not have acted according to the standard of a cool, calm and
collected man, or have measured the amount of force necessary to
make the arrest with deliberation or absolute precision. Neither
would the fact that his conduct was that of a man who was excitable,
unnatural and indiscreet, if you should so find, be sufficient to justify
you in finding that his conduct was wrongful. The standard to be used
in measuring his conduct is that he must conduct himself as an ordin-
arily prudent man would have done under the circumstances as shown
by the evidence.
No. 3
ARREST-CONDUCT OF OFFICER
The law does not require an officer in making an arrest for a mis-
demeanor, if resistance to arrest is offered, to determine with absolute
precision what force is necessary to accomplish his purpose, and the
officer is permitted reasonable discretion. The officer, however, is not
* In 1949 the Standardized Jury Instructions which had been adopted by
the Association of District Judges of Nebraska up to that year were printed in
pamphlet form. Since then, the Association has adopted additional instructions,
all of which are included in this Cumulative Supplement.
Criticism of all the adopted instructions is invited, and it is urged that all
members of the legal profession in Nebraska cooperate in this field of endeavor
to the end that the collection of adopted instructions to juries may be further
enlarged and improved.
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permitted to use any more force than that which would appear to an
ordinarily prudent person, under all the existing circumstances, to be
reasonably necessary to make an arrest.
No. 4
ARREST WITHOUT A WARRANT
Under the Laws of Nebraska, any member of the Nebraska Safety
Patrol has the powers of a peace officer for the purpose of enforcing
the laws regulating the operations of motor vehicles, or the use of
the highways, and after establishing his identity as such officer, has
authority to demand the presentation of a motor vehicle operator's
license from anyone operating a motor vehicle on the public high-
ways of the state. The failure to present a motor vehicle operator's
license upon such demand constitutes a misdemeanor, and subjects
the person guilty of such failure to arrest without a warrant by such
officer. Therefore the defendant, John Doe, as a member of the Ne-
braska Safety Patrol had the right and authority to demand that the
plaintiff present his motor vehicle operator's license, and upon failure
of the plaintiff to do so, in conformity with such order, the defendant
Doe had the right to arrest the plaintiff without a warrant.
No. 5
ARREST-USE OF FORCE
In making an arrest, the officer may use whatever force is reason-
ably necessary to effect the arrest. If the person sought to be arrested
resists, the officer may use such force as may be reasonably necessary
under the circumstances to overcome the resistance and make an
effective arrest. However, an officer may not use violence dispro-
portionate to the extent of the resistance offered, and if he uses un-
necessary and excessive force, or acts wantonly or maliciously, he is
liable therefor in damages. In this case if you find from a preponderance
of the evidence, that the plaintiff did not offer resistance to his arrest,
the defendant Doe was without authority to use force against the
plaintiff. On the other hand, if you find from a preponderance of the
evidence that resistance was offered by the plaintiff, then the de-
fendant Doe had the authority to overcome such resistance by the
use of force but only such force as was reasonably necessary to over-
come such resistance and arrest the plaintiff. However, the burden
is not on the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the force used was not excessive.
No. 6
ASSAULT AND BATTERY-DEFINITIONS
An "Assault" is a wrongful offer or attempt, with force and violence
to do bodily hurt to another, with apparent means to carry out such
offer or attempt.
BAR NOTES
An "Assault" is a wrongful offer or attempt with unlawful force
or threats made in a menacing manner to inflict bodily injury upon
another with the present apparent ability to give effect to the attempt.
The word "Battery" as used in these instructions is any unlawful
physical violence or contact inflicted on a human being without his
consent.
No. 7
ASSAULT AND BATTERY-GREAT BODILY INJURY-DEFINITIONS
You are instructed that the use of any unlawful violence upon the
person of another with intent to injure him, whatever be the means
or degree of violence used, is an assault and battery. The term "great
bodily injury," as used in this case, implies an injury of a graver and
more serious character than an ordinary battery.
No. 8
BLOOD TEST EVIDENCE, DRUNKEN DRIVER CASES
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-727.01 (Cum. Supp. 1951).
The Statutes of Nebraska provide in any criminal action relating
to operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcoholic
liquor, that if there is proof of the presence of alcohol in the defendant's
blood, as shown by chemical analysis, such evidence shall give rise to
rebuttable presumptions, as follows:
1. If there was 0.05% or less by weight of alcohol in his blood, it
shall be presumed that he was not under the influence of
alcoholic liquor at the time the specimen of his blood was ob-
tained;
2. If there was in excess of 0.05% but less than 0.15% by weight of
alcohol in his blood, such fact shall not give rise to any pre-
sumption that he was or was not under the influence of alcoholic
liquor but may be considered by the jury together with other
evidence relating to his guilt or innocence;
3. If there was 0.15% or more by weight of alcohol in his blood, it
shall be presumed that he was under the influence of alcoholic
liquor at the time the specimen of his blood was obtained.
(The law requires that tests, to be considered valid, shall be shown
to have been performed according to a method approved by the De-
partment of Health of the State of Nebraska and by a person possess-
ing a valid permit issued by said department for such purpose.)
(Omit unless there is a dispute in the evidence as to whether or
not the method used followed the statutes.)
Accordingly, you should consider the blood test evidence in this
case. Before it can give rise to a presumption that the defendant was
under the influence of alcoholic liquor, the burden of proof is upon
the State to prove each and all of the following four (three) proposi-
tions beyond a reasonable doubt by said blood test evidence:
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1. That the blood test evidence related to a specimen of blood
obtained from the defendant;
2. That said specimen of blood has not been tampered with be-
tween the time it was obtained from the defendant and the time
it was chemically analyzed;
3. That the test was performed according to a method approved by
said Department of Health, and by a person possessing a valid
permit issued by said Department for such purpose;
(Omit unless there is a dispute in the evidence as to whether
or not the method used followed the statutes.)
4. That there was 0.15% or more by weight of alcohol in the blood
of the defendant at the time such specimen was obtained, as
shown by chemical analysis.
If you are not satisfied that by said blood test evidence the State
has proved each and all of said four (three) propositions beyond a
reasonable doubt, then said evidence cannot give rise to a presumption
that the defendant was under the influence of alcoholic liquor.
If you find that the blood test evidence is sufficient to give rise
to a presumption that the defendant was or was not under the in-
fluence of alcoholic liquor, the effect thereof is to allow you to infer
such fact without direct proof by other evidence. A presumption, if
raised by the evidence, is not conclusive proof of such fact, and may
be rebutted or disproved. Such presumption has the force of evidence
sufficient to support a verdict unless contradictory evidence is pre-
sented- which in your opinion overcomes the presumption. If you find
said evidence is sufficient to give rise to such presumption, it is your
duty to weigh such presumption together with all other evidence
relating to the guilt or innocence of the defendant, giving the pre-
sumption such weight as you find it is entitled to receive under all
of the facts and circumstances.
A presumption of this character does not have the effect of shifting
the burden of proof, which is always upon the State to prove the guilt
of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.
The defendant is not required to offer proof beyond a resonable
doubt in order to give rise to a presumption that the defendant was
not under the influence of alcoholic liquor. (The giving of this para-
graph is optional.)
(A similar instruction may be used for body fluids other than
blood.)
No. 9
CONFESSION-WHEN IT MAY BE CONSIDERED AS EVIDENCE
Exhibit "0" has been offered by the State as a confession of the
defendant. If you are satisfied from the evidence that Exhibit "0"
is a statement made voluntarily by John Doe and (was) not obtained
BAR NOTES
by compulsion or fear nor by any promise or inducements offered to
him, you may consider it the same as any other evidence, otherwise
you shall reject it and not consider it for any purpose whatsoever.
Cramer v. State, 145 Neb. 88, 15 N.W.2d 323 (1944);
Schlegel v. State, 143 Neb. 497, 10 N.W.2d 264 (1943).
No. 10
DAMAGES-SEEPAGE OF WATER FROM CANALS OR RESERVOIRS
If you find for the plaintiff, it will become your duty to determine
the amount that the plaintiff shall recover. If you do not find for the
plaintiff, you are not concerned with any determination of any amount
of damages. The amount of the plaintiff's recovery, if any, will be
the difference between the reasonable market value of the lands
hereinbefore described, without any seepage from the defendant's
canals or reservoirs upon it, and the reasonable market value of said
lands with such seepage upon it as you find from the evidence resulted
from leekage from said canals or reservoirs, all as of the time you
find such seepage first became visibly apparent upon said lands, plus
the amount that you find the reasonable market value of any annual
crop such as corn, that you find had already been planted at the time
of the appearance of such seepage, was diminished in amount by
and on account of leekage from said canals or reservoirs, all at the
time and place of the occurrence of such seepage. You cannot allow
for any item of damage except as you find it shown by a preponderance
of the evidence. You cannot allow any amount for injury to any
perennial crop such as alfalfa or prairie grass, for the reason that
such perennial crops are parts and parcels of the lands. You cannot
allow any amount for any annual crops for any year other than the
first year. You cannot allow for any damage that arose from seepage
that was caused from rainfall or surface water accumulating in ponds
or swails upon the surface of the plaintiff's lands. The defendant can
only be held liable for damage that would not have occurred except
on account of leakage from its said canals or reservoirs. If you find
that water from the defendant's canals or reservoirs has combined
with waters from other sources for which defendant would not be
responsible, and find that such combined waters have caused damage
to the plaintiff's land, then before the plaintiff can recover it is en-
cumbent upon him either to show that such damages would have oc-
curred from such waters from the defendant's canals or reservoirs alone
without any water from other sources, or to allocate and separate the
amount of damage done by waters from such canals or reservoirs from
the amount of damage done by waters from such other sources.
If you find that the plaintiff is entitled to recover, you will make no
allowance by way of interest as that is a matter which will be con-
sidered and disposed of by the court.
Smith v. Platte Valley Public Power and Irrigation District, 151 Neb.
49, 36 N.W. 2d 478 (1949).
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No. 11
TABLES OF EXPECTANCY
You are instructed that in an action for damages for personal in-
juries, if such injuries are found to be permanent, the tables of ex-
pectancy of life are competent as bearing upon and tending to prove
the expectancy of life, but are not conclusive. They are to be received
and considered by the jury as any other evidence and subject to the
same rules as to their weight and sufficiency as other testimony. They
should be considered together with all other facts and circumstances
in evidence bearing on the expected life of the plaintiff (or plaintiff's
decedent).
No. 12
FAMILY PURPOSE CAR
In this case the evidence shows that the automobile being driven
by John Doe at the time of the accident in question was owned by the
defendant William Doe.
You are instructed that in order for the plaintiff to be entitled to
recover against the defendant William Doe for the alleged negligence
of John Doe, if any, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the automobile of the defendant being driven by John
Doe at the time of the accident in question was a family purpose car,
that is to say, that it was an automobile owned and maintained by the
defendant William Doe for his own use and for the use, pleasure or
benefit of members of his family; that the members of his family were
permitted to use said car for their individual benefit, pleasure or con-
venience; that John Doe was a member of the family of the defendant
William Doe and one for whose use and benefit said car was main-
tained; and that John Doe was so using said car at the time of the
accident.
If you find from a preponderance of the evidence that said auto-
mobile was a family purpose car, you should then consider negligent
acts of John Doe, if any, as negligence on the part of the defendant
himself.
No. 13
GUEST PASSENGER, STANDARD OF DUTY
You are instructed that the standard of duty of an invited guest
riding in an automobile is the same as that of the driver, but the con-
duct to fulfill that duty is ordinarily different because their circum-
stances are different. It is the duty of the guest to use care in keeping
a lookout commensurate with that of an ordinarily prudent person
under like circumstances. A guest is not required to watch'ife road
or to advise the driver in relation to the management of hisauto-
BAR NOTES
mobile under ordinary conditions -and may assume that the driver
is reasonably safe and careful except when the guest has knowledge
which indicates to the contrary.
But when a situation arises which is out of the usual and ordinary,
or if the guest perceives danger, the guest is under the duty to exer-
6ise ordinary care to warn of dangers which would or should be ap-
parent to him, unless to a reasonably careful, cautious and prudent
person it appears that the warning would be of no avail or go unheeded,
or that the driver observed or should have observed the danger as
well as the guest. Also it is the duty of an invited guest with knowl-
edge of approaching danger, in the exercise of ordinary care, to pro-
test to the driver if there is time and opportunity, unless it reasonably
appears that such protest would go unheeded or would be of no avail,
(or if reasonably necessary, to ask permission to leave the vehicle.)
You are further instructed that the failure of a guest to fulfill the
duty as herein set forth would constitute negligence.
Hendrix v. Vana, 153 Neb. 531, 45 N.W. 2d 429 (1951); Marks v. Dorkin,
105 Conn. 521, 163 Atl. 83 (1927); Restatement, Torts § 495 (1934).
No. 14
JURY TO CONSIDER ALL INSTRUCTIONS
You are cautioned that the court has not attempted to embody all
the law applicable to this case in any one instruction. Therefore, in con-
sidering any one instruction given you herein, you should consider it
in the light of and in harmony with all the other instructions given
you in this case.
No. 15
JURY, CONDUCT OF IN SEPARATE HOTEL ROOMS IN CRIMINAL CASES
If you have not agreed upon a verdict by 10 o'clock p.m., you will
be taken by the bailiffs to the hotel where arrangements will be made
for you to spend the night.
You will be assigned to rooms by ihe bailiffs and will go to your
rooms promptly. After going to your rooms you will remain in them
except by permission of a bailiff until called by the bailiffs.
You will at no time while outside the jury room converse with or
suffer yourselves to be addressed by any other person on the subject
of the trial nor to listen to any conversation on the subject. You will
also refrain from discussing the case among yourselves until you re-
turn to the jury room, neither will you use the telephone for any pur-
pose.
Be obedient to the instructions of the bailiffs and observe both the
letter and the spirit of this instruction.
- (To be g ven only in case of necessity.)
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No. 16
MOTOR VEHICLE DRIVER UNDER AGE *
The statutes of the State of Nebraska further provide that it shall
be unlawful for any person under 16 years of age to operate a motor
vehicle, with certain exceptions with which we are not here concerned,
and but for these exceptions the statute further provides that no license
shall, under any circumstances, be issued to any person who has not
attainted the age of full 16 years; and the statute further provides
that it shall be unlawful for one to authorize, cause or knowingly per-
mit his child under the age of 16 years to drive a motor vehicle upon
any highway when such minor is not authorized under a statute to
do so, or to authorize or knowingly permit a motor vehicle owned by
him or under his control to be driven upon any highway by any person
who is not authorized to drive as provided by statute.
The foregoing statutes are passed in the interest of public safety
and the violation thereof is evidence to be considered together with
all other facts and circumstances in evidence in determining whether
or not such person was negligent, but some causal relation between
the violation of such statute and the accident must exist before it
could enter into the plaintiff's recovery in this case, and therefore,
unless you find that the age of the defendant driver did cause or con-
tribute to cause the accident, you will not consider it in reaching a
conclusion as to liability.
Pratt v. Western Bridge & Construction Co., 116 Neb. 553, 218 N.W. 41d
(1928); Note, 73 A.L.R. 156 (1931);
Blashfield, Instructions to Juries §§ 591, 593 (1916).
* Judge Thomsen's note: Before giving any of the foregoing instruction, see
Wysock v. Borchers Bros., 104 Cal. App. 2d 571, 232 P. 2d 531 (1951), and the
annotation to this case in Note, 29 A.L.R. 2d 963 (1953).
No. 17
MOTOR VEHICLE HOMICIDE-PROOF OF UNLAWFUL OPERATION
The charge in the information that the defendant was "engaged
in the unlawful operation of a motor vehicle" requires proof of gross
or great and excessive negligence, or negligence of a very high degree.
It requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a motor vehicle was
operated in such a manner as to create an obvious danger of injury
to the person or property of others, and wherein the conduct of the
driver is such as to indicate either a willingness to inflict injury or
damage, or a conscious indifference to the probable and injurious
consequences thereof. It is necessary to prove more than mere in-
advertence or want of ordinary care. Proof of the violation of a
statute regulating speed or prescribing precautions to be observed by
drivers of motor vehicles, if such you find, is not conclusive, but is a
BAR NOTES
circumstance bearing upon the question, and, if established, should be
considered together with all of the other facts and circumstances.
"Negligence" is defined as the failure to do what reasonable and
prudent persons would ordinarily have done under the circumstances,
or, doing what reasonable and prudent persons would ordinarily not
have done under the circumstances. It ig the failure to exercise
"ordinary care" which is that amount or degree of care which ordinary
prudence and a proper regard for one's own safety and the safety of
others requires under the circumstances. (This paragraph is optional.)
Unless you find that such unlawful operation of a motor vehicle by
the defendant has been established by the evidence beyond a reason-
able doubt, your verdict will be not guilty.
No. 18
MOTOR VEHICLE HOMICIDE-PROXIMATE CAUSE
The charge in the information that the defendant did "cause the
death" requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt not only of unlaw-
ful operation of a motor vehicle by the defendant, but also that such
unlawful operation was the proximate cause of the death. In other
words, such death must be shown to have been the natural and
probable consequence of such unlawful operation of a motor vehicle,
and not of any independent cause.
By "proximate cause" is meant the primary cause or fault where
no other cause disconnected therefrom intervenes to produce the
result.
Unless you find that it has been established by the evidence beyond
a reasonable doubt that such death was proximately caused by un-
lawful operation of a motor vehicle by the defendant, your verdict
will be not guilty.
No. 19
MOTOR VEHICLE HOMICIDE-NON-CRIMINAL CAUSE OF DEATH
IS PRESUMED
The mere fact that an accident occurred and that a death resulted,
if such you find, does not alone and of itself establish proof of un-
lawful operation of a motor vehicle. In the absence of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt to the contrary, the law presumes that death results
from accidental or natural causes of a non-criminal character.
No. 20
NEGLIGENCE OF PERSON NOT PARTY TO THE ACTION
You are instructed that regarding contributory negligence the
tatutes of Nebraska provide: "The fact that the plaintiff may have
been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery when
the contributory negligence of the plaintiff was slight and the neg-
ligence of the defendant was gross in comparison, but the contribu-
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tory negligence of the plaintiff shall be considered by the jury in the
mitigation of damages in proportion to the amount of contributory
negligence attributable to the plaintiff." Before you can apply this
statute you must have determined what negligence, if any, was the
proximate cause of said accident and the person or persons guilty of
said negligence.
Under this statute, if you find both the plaintiff and the defendant
were negligent, and that such negligence concurred to form the proxi-
mate cause of said accident or a part of such proximate cause, the
plaintiff cannot recover in this case, if you find from the evidence that
his negligence when compared with that of the defendant was more
than slight; neither can he recover if you find from the evidence that
,the negligence of the defendant when compared with that of the
plaintiff was less than gross.
You will note that the comparison required up to this point is a
comparison between the negligence of the plaintiff, if any, on the one
hand, and the negligence of the defendant, if any, on the other hand.
If you find that the plaintiff was guilty of slight negligence, and
that the negligence of the defendant in comparison therewith was
gross, the plaintiff is entitled to recover, but in that event it is your
duty to mitigate or deduct from the whole amount of damages, if
any, sustained by the plaintiff as required by the statute. To do this,
you should determine if AB (third person not a party) was negligent
and, if so, whether his negligence concurred with the negligence of
the defendant and the plaintiff to form the proximate cause of the
accident.
If you find that AB was negligent and that his negligence was a
part of the proximate cause of said accident and plaintiff's damage,
then you should consider th negligence of AB and compare the
negligence of the plaintiff with the combined negligence of all the
negligent persons and deduct from the whole amount of damages, if
any, sustained by the plaintiff such proportion thereof as the con-
tributory negligence chargeable to the plaintiff bears to the entire
negligence as shown by the evidence and return a verdict for the
balance only.
No. 21
NEGLIGENCE-LEFT TURN BETWEEN INTERSECTIONS
It is not unlawful to turn to the left into a private driveway in be-
tween intersections, nor is it negligence as a matter of law to do so,
but to turn to the left between intersections is such an unusual oc-
currence that other drivers would not readily anticipate such a move-
ment and, therefore, requires upon the part of the one so turning the
exercise of that degree of care which the possible danger from such
a movement might create or encounter, and consequently, requires an
BAR NOTES
extra effort and precaution on the one so turning to see that the move-
ment can be made with reasonable safety.
With the foregoing rule in mind, it became the duty of the plain-
tiff not only to indicate by the required sign that he intended to turn
to the left across the path of other vehicles, but to exericse ordinary
care in observing whether such movement could be made with rea-
sonable safety, and if you find from all the facts and circumstances in
evidence that it would have appeared to an ordinary prudent man
in the situation in which the plaintiff found himself before he made
the turn and while he was proceeding, that he could do so with rea-
sonable safety, you are then not warranted in finding he was negligent
in doing so. On the other hand, if you find that in the exercise of the
degree of care described in the forepart of this instruction, the plain-
tiff should not have proceeded to cross the lanes of eastbound traffic,
the plaintiff would be negligent in doing so. In determining whether
or not he could do so with reasonable safety, you should consider
whether a preponderance of the evidence establishes that the light for
east and west traffic at the time defendant's car approached such light,
was red, and the speed at which it would appear to one using ordinary
care the defendant was approaching such intersection, and whether
under the conditions the plaintiff could reasonably anticipate that
defendant would continue eastward, and all other facts and cir-
cumstances in evidence.
Angstadt v. Coleman, 156 Neb. 850, 58 N.W. 2d 507 (1953).
No. 22
REASONABLE DOUBT
A reasonable doubt, within the meaning of the law, is such a doubt
as would cause a prudent and considerate person, in the graver and
more important affairs of life, to pause and hesitate before acting upon
the truth of the matters charged. It does not mean the possibility
that the accused may be innocent, nor does it mean an imaginary doubt
or one based upon groundless conjecture, but it does mean an actual
and substantial doubt, having some reason for its basis. It may arise
from the evidence or from lack of evidence in the case. If upon full
consideration of all the evidence for the state and for the defendant
your minds are in that condition that you cannot say that you feel a
confidence, amounting to a moral certainty, from all the evidence in
the case that the defendant is guilty, then you have a reasonable
doubt. If, however, after a careful and impartial consideration of all
the evidence the jury have an abiding conviction of the guilt of the
accused and are fully satisfied of the truth of the charge, then the
jury are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt.
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No. 23
RES IPSA LOQUITUR
If you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the thing
which caused the accident in this case was under the exclusive man-
agement and control of the defendant, and that the accident was such
that in the ordinary course of events it would not have happened if
defendant had used ordinary care in such control and management,
then the jury may infer that defendant was negligent without any
proof of specific acts of negligence.
The jury, however, is not required to so infer negligence but should
give all the evidence full and fair consideration. It is for the jury to
say whether under all the facts and circumstances in evidence the
defendant was or was not negligent.
NoTE: The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, although it provides a
substitute for direct proof of negligence where plaintiff is unable
to point out the specific act of negligence which caused his injury,
is a rule of necessity to be invoked only when, under the cir-
cumstances involved, direct evidence is absent and not readily
available.... However, plaintiff is not deprived of the benefit of
the doctrine from the mere introduction of evidence which does not
clearly establish the facts or leaves the matter doubtful, for, if the
case is a proper one for the application of the doctrine and the
pleading is such that it may be invoked, an unsuccessful attempt
on the part of plaintiff to show the specific negligent act which
caused his injury does not weaken or displace the presumption
of negligence on the part of the defendant arising from the facts
of the case by virtue of the rule of res ipsa loquitur.
45 C.J. § 774 (1928).
No. 24
SELF-DEFENSE
The defendant contends that he was first assaulted by one John
Doe, and that what he did thereafter was in self-defense, and for the
purpose of repelling the attack made on him.
In this connection you are instructed that if you find that the
defendant was threatened or attacked by John Doe, in such a manner
that it caused the defendant to believe that he was in danger of
receiving bodily injury, he was justified in using such force to repel
the attack as at that time appeared to him to be reasonably necessary,
although he may have been mistaken as to the extent of the actual
danger, if a reasonable person would also have been mistaken. He
is justified in acting, in such a case, upon the facts as they appeared to
him, and is not necessarily to be judged by the facts as they actually
were.
However, when the person threatened uses more force to defend
himself than is reasonably necessary, or, in other words, uses excessive
force, or resorts to acts of violence upon his antagonist not called for
in necessary self-defense, he then, in law, becomes the assailant, and
BAR NOTES
when such unnecessary force is used, the party using such force be-
comes guilty of unlawful assault and battery and is criminally
responsible therefor.
No. 25
SELF-DEFENSE-COMPANION INSTRUCTIONS
25A
The law of self-defense is founded in necessity. The danger appre-
hended must be urgent and pressing, or apparently so, at the time of
the alleged conduct of the defendant which he seeks to justify as being
in self-defense. The right of self-defense is given only in an emergency
to enable persons who may be attacked or assaulted or to whom it may
reasonably appear that they are in immediate danger of personal in-
jury or violence, to defend their persons.
If you believe from the evidence that the said John Doe began the
affray and was the aggressor, then you are instructed that the defendant
had a right to defend himself from such assault, and he would have a
right to use that amount of force which, under the circumstances, ap-
peared to him to be reasonable and necessary in making his defense.
25B
Actual and positive danger is not indispensible to self-defense. The
law considers that when a person is threatened with danger, he is en-
titled to judge from appearances and to determine therefrom as to
the actual state of things as they appear to him; and in such case, if
the accused person acts with an honest belief under the circumstances,
he will not be held responsible criminally for a mistake as to the
actual danger, although it afterwards appears that the accused was
in no actual danger, or that he used more force than was actually
necessary to protect himself from serious bodily harm.
The rule in such case is this: What would a reasonable person
of ordinary caution, judgment and observation, in the position of the
defendant, seeing what he saw and knowing what he knew, do under
the situation and surroundings? If such person so placed would be
justified in believing himself in imminent danger of personal injury
or violence, then the defendant was justified in believing himself in
such peril, and in acting on such appearances.
25C
Words of provocation alone will not justify an assault; neither will
a slight assault justify a person in using more force or violence than is
reasonable and apparently necessary to protect his person from injury.
Further, the law of self-defense does not permit acts done in re-
taliation or revenge. Therefore, if you believe that the defendant,
sought, brought on, or voluntarily entered into an altercation with
the said John Doe, for the purpose of wreaking vengeance upon him,
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or to accomplish some unlawful purpose; or, if the jury believe from
the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant stabbed
and cut the said John Doe, at a time when he had, because of the acts
of said John Doe, no reasonable apprehension of immediate or impend-
ing danger to himself, or did it to accomplish some unlawful purpose,
or did it in a spirit of retaliation or revenge, for the purpose of
punishing the said John Doe for some grievance, real or imgainary,
supposed to have been committed by the said Doe against the accused,
then the defendant cannot avail himself of the law of self-defense, as
such conduct on the part of the defandant, should you so find, would
be unjustified and unlawful.
See Lambert v. State, 80 Neb. 562, 114 N.W. 775 (1908).
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In determining whether the alleged conduct of the defendant was
committed in necessary defense of his person, and in determining
whether the amount of force and violence used was apparently reason-
ably necessary for said purpose, you should consider all the acts and
conduct of the defendant and the complaining witness at the time
in question; the means, nature and extent of any force or violence
used by either the said Doe, towards the accused, or the accused to-
wards the said Doe; the character and place of any wounds; what was
said by the parties at that time; and all the facts and circumstances
surrounding the occurrence as shown by the evidence, bearing upon the
question whether the conduct of the accused was reasonably and ap-
parently necessary, in good faith, to defend his person, or whether
defendant was acting maliciously or in a spirit of retaliation or revenge.
It is not incumbent upon the accused to satisfy the jury, by the weight
of evidence, that the acts with which he is charged were justified or
excusable, but if the evidence thereon is sufficient to raise a reasonable
doubt in the minds of the jury as to the guilt of the defendant, you
should give the defendant the benefit of such doubt and acquit him.
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SELF-DEFENSE
"Assault" or "attack," as used in these instructions pertaining to
the defense of self-defense, does not necessarily mean that an actual
blow must have been struck but means any act causing a well-
founded belief of immediate peril.
While a person has the right, when assaulted by another in such
a manner to excite in him a reasonable belief that he was in danger
of losing his life or receiving great bodily injury, to resist the attack
or assault by using such force as was apparently necessary to defend
himself, yet if, after he has secured himself from danger, he proceeds
to make an attack or assault upon his assailant in a spirit of revenge,
I BAR NOTES
or for some other unlawful purpose, he cannot claim exemption from
punishment on the ground of self-defense.
Under the law, words alone, no matter how abusive, vexatious or
provocative, will not justify an assault.
If you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant was the aggressor and made the first assault upon John
Doe and before John Doe had made any assault upon him, then and
in that case the defendant would not be entitled to avail himself of the
right of self-defense. If, however, you believe from the evidence that
the said John Doe made the first assault upon the defendant, then the
defendant would have such right.
Regarding the offense with which the defendant is charged, it is
necessary for the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant, William Roe, was not acting in self-defense and the burden
is not on the defendant to prove he was acting in self-defense, and if
the evidence in this case does not establish beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant was not acting in self-defense, then you should find
the defendant not guilty.
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